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Abstract
Cigarette manufacturers' monopsony power exertion in procuring domestic and imported tobacco
is investigated using nonparametric methods.  While it is often assumed that tobacco program rents are
captured by growers, results indicate the opposite actually occurs.  Cigarette manufacturers appear to
exert significant monopsony power in the domestic leaf tobacco market and capture a large portion of
program rents.  Cigarette manufacturers appear to exert monopsony power of much smaller magnitude in
the international leaf tobacco market, but with increasing magnitude in more recent years.
Keywords:  market power, tobacco, nonparametric, monopsony, imports.
JEL Classification:  L1.2
MONOPSONY POWER IN MULTIPLE INPUT MARKETS:
A NONPARAMETRIC APPROACH
The cigarette manufacturing industry has long been touted as an example of an imperfectly
competitive industry.  In 1992, the four largest firms supplied ninety-three percent of cigarette
production in an industry that consisted of only eight firms (Census of Manufacturers).  Given the high
concentration that exists in this industry, monopoly power exertion by cigarette manufacturers is
certainly plausible and is often examined (Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987; Sullivan 1985; Sumner 1981;
Roeger 1995; Hall 1988).  However, there is another possibility that has not received much attention. 
High concentration in cigarette manufacturing also supports the possibility that cigarette manufacturers
exert monopsony power in domestic and international tobacco procurement.
U.S. leaf tobacco producers are organized as a cartel through a marketing quota system
administered through the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  It is generally assumed the marketing quota
system is effective and that growers capture quota rents achieved by reducing production to less than free
market quantities and thereby raising price (Brown and Martin 1996; Brown 1995; Babcock and Foster
1992; Sumner and Wohlgenant 1985; Johnson and Norton 1983).  However, this belief is predicated on
the untested assumption that tobacco leaf buyers behave competitively.  Even if the quota effectively
restricts supply, there is no guarantee that growers capture quota rents.  Cigarette manufacturers'
monopsony market power exertion could shift quota rent from growers to manufactures.
U.S. cigarette manufacturers are also relatively large buyers in the world leaf tobacco market.  In
1993, U.S. firms purchased 21 percent of tobacco leaves sold on the world market (FAO), suggesting the
possibility that U.S. cigarette manufacturers may also exert monopsony power in the international leaf3
tobacco market.  Recent Department of Justice (DOJ) inquiries into possible collusion by cigarette
manufacturers in procuring imported tobacco makes this an appealing analysis as well.
Previous studies have considered monopoly power exertion by tobacco processors (Ashenfelter
and Sullivan; Sullivan; Sumner), but cigarette manufacturers’ potential monopsony power in procuring
tobacco from domestic and international growers has received little attention
1.  In this study, we draw
upon Love and Shumway’s (1994) nonparametric monopsony power test to consider possible
monopsony power exertion by cigarette manufacturers in procuring domestic and imported leaf tobacco. 
We expand the test to examine monopsony power in two input markets, including domestic and
imported tobacco.  We also extend the test to include the possibility of both Hicks-neutral and biased
technical change in output and all inputs.  While two-digit SIC level manufacturing data has been used
to examine market power in the industry (e.g., Roeger, Hall), we conduct our analysis using more
specific four-digit SIC code data.  We incorporate costs of labor, advertising, capital, and materials.
This paper is organized as follows.  We present a brief discussion of the U.S. tobacco program as
a potential vehicle for monopsony market power exertion.  Next, we present Love and Shumway’s
approach to monopsony market power measurement, extending their test to assess monopsony market
power exertion in multiple input markets.  We also extend the approach to measure biased technical
change in addition to Hicks neutral technical change.  The tests are then implemented to analyze
cigarette manufacturers’ potential monopsony power exertion in the domestic and international tobacco
markets.  Empirical results are followed by concluding remarks.4
Institutional Setting
Flue-cured and burley tobacco national marketing quota levels are determined annually as the
sum of intended purchases announced by domestic cigarette manufacturers, the average of tobacco
exports for the three preceding years, and an adjustment to maintain loan stocks at the specified reserve-
stock level of 15 percent of basic quota, but no less than a specified minimum stock level.
2 Eligible
producers must approve the quota in a referendum held every three years; once approved, all producers
are required to maintain marketing quota equivalent to their sales weight.  Individual growers are
assigned a specific quota in exchange for a price support equal to the preceding year’s support price
adjusted by changes in the five year moving average of cash prices excluding the highest and lowest
years (weighted b) and changes in a cost of production index (weighted a).  The cost of production
index used in the support price formula is based on variable cost and excludes land and quota rent and
other capital costs.  As a result, the support price does not offer leaf tobacco producers a guarantee of
price above the average variable cost.
Producer-owned cooperative associations have administered the support price program on a “no-
net-cost” basis since 1982.  Any support payments must be covered by farmer member expenditures.
3 
Cooperatives serve as facilitators of the marketing quota and as suppliers of storage capacity for reserved
stocks.  Cooperatives purchase tobacco when the bid price is less than one cent above the support. 
Inventories obtained through price support activities must be liquidated in subsequent periods.  In 1993,
the USDA-ASCS reported over 350,000 tobacco quota owners.  
The common assumption in the literature is that the marketing quota is effective and that the
entire quota rent is captured by quota owners (Brown and Martin 1996; Brown 1995; Fulginiti and Perrin
1993; Babcock and Foster 1992; Sumner and Wohlgenant 1985; Johnson and Norton 1983).  However,5
cigarette manufacturers are highly concentrated.  According to Philip Morris, the top 4 cigarette
manufacturing firms produced 42.3%, 28.8%, 18.7%, and 7.2% of total output in 1996 (97% of
production).  Since manufacturers have a large part in determining national quota levels, and since the
support price can do little to raise cash price above average production cost, it is unclear whether the
program actually succeeds in transferring quota rent to leaf growers as is commonly assumed.
Brown and Martin contend that “the inclusion of domestic purchase intentions and the
adjustment for cooperative inventories in the quota formula makes the national marketing quota very
responsive to downward shifts in demand for U.S. tobacco” (p.446).  Though it is not the program’s
intent, inclusion of cigarette manufacturer’s domestic purchase intentions and the adjustment for reserve
inventories in the quota formula may actually allow cigarette manufacturers to shift a portion of quota
rent from producers to themselves.  In effect, the quota adjustment formula gives manufacturers a large
degree of control over tobacco producers’ annual production and ultimately market price.  Indeed, at
times, cigarette manufacturers have acted to “maintain” quota by purchasing excess stocks accumulated
by cooperatives which threatened to significantly decrease the marketing quota in subsequent years.  For
example, the 1994 burley tobacco stock levels would have resulted in a forty percent quota reduction for
1995.  However, cigarette manufacturers agreed to purchase enough excess stocks to avoid a quota
reduction (Brown 1996a).  A similar situation occurred in the 1995 flue-cured market.  It is possible that
quota reductions not anticipated by manufacturers would restrict leaf supply and require cigarette
manufacturers' to bid more aggressively in future periods.  As a consequence, rents would be shifted to
growers and manufacturers would lose control of market supply.  In this light, manufacturers' excess
stock purchases might be viewed as a strategic decision to maintain control of future quota levels.  In
this institutional setting it is unclear whether the tobacco program offers producers the protection6
commonly assumed in policy analyses or whether cigarette manufacturers extract at least a portion of
quota rents through monopsony market power exertion in leaf purchases.  
Nonparametric Market Power Tests
 Market power exertion is typically measured as the deviation from marginal cost pricing. In the
case of monopsony power, this translates to an input price less than the value of marginal product
(VMP).  Several recent studies have developed nonparametric tests to assess market power exertion. 
Ashenfelter and Sullivan utilize data search methods to measure monopoly power while Love and
Shumway and Lambert (1994) develop nonparametric monopsony market power tests in a single input
market using a linear programming framework.  Nonparametric market power tests employ a revealed
preference approach founded on the Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM).   Such tests offer
alternatives to parametric tests of market power in that they circumvent the issue of functional form
choice for behavioral equations (Varian 1984, 1985, 1990).  
Recent nonparametric market power tests have incorporated measures of other variables which, if
not accounted for, could distort market power measurements (Lambert; Love and Shumway).  Love and
Shumway's test incorporates Hicks neutral technical change measures following techniques from Chavas
and Cox’s (1988, 1990, 1992) and Cox and Chavas’ (1990) work in production economics.  However, it
may be unreasonable to assume that only Hicks neutral technical change occurred over the time period. 
Biased technical change measures are also easily incorporated, again following techniques developed in
the aforementioned studies. 
Nonparametric market power tests exploit the idea that firms with market power maximize
profits by restricting quantities in order to exploit the slope of output demand or input supply and that, at
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where p is output price, yi is firm i’s output, rm is the price of input m, xmi is quantity of variable input m
demanded by firm i, and x is the vector of variable inputs.  Fi(x, B) is firm i’s production function and
Fi(x, B) $Yi(yi, A) where Yi denotes “effective output” and A>0 and B>0 are technology indices (Cox
and Chavas).  Note that this specification of the test allows Hicks-neutral technical change with respect
to output and biased technical change in all inputs, including monopsonistically purchased inputs.  Fi(x,
B) is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave in x.  Yi is assumed to be strictly increasing in yi
where yi(Yi, A) is the inverse function of Yi(y i, A).  Assuming the firm chooses quantities (x, yi) over T
time periods where each time period is characterized by input prices r
t, output price p
t, technology A
t,
and technology B 







T} with the profit maximization hypothesis while considering the degree of market power exertion.     
A firm with monopsony power in the nth input market can influence input price rn by its choice
of input level xni, i.e. by reducing input purchases of xni, the firm can reduce the price it must pay for
every unit purchased.  The monopsonistic firm’s first-order profit-maximizing condition, in discrete
terms and including technical change measures, is
where t and s represent different time periods, xmi is the quantity of variable input xm  purchased by the















Equation (2) simply restates WAPM in terms of the quantity choice at time t, i.e., at observed prices in
time t, the observed quantity at time t yields at least as much profit as any other quantity choice. 
Equation (2) also gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the firm’s decision set Si to be
consistent with profit maximization (See proposition 1 in Chavas and Cox, 1990).  The term 0i
ts gives
the firm’s perceived  price flexibility of  residual supply for the n
th input and provides a measure of
monopsony power exertion.  The price flexibility, 0i










ts is the marginal value product of the nth input for the ith firm for the time interval ts (Love and
Shumway).  Thus, 0i
ts gives a direct measure of the monopsony Lerner index.  If 0i
ts = 0, then firm i
cannot impact input price by adjusting quantity purchased in period t, i.e. the firm has no market power.  
Empirical implementation of the market power test requires an assumption about the form of
technical change.  Chavas and Cox (1990) provide a thorough discussion of technical change hypotheses
which make the problem empirically tractable without imposing a parametric model of technology. 
Love and Shumway assume the output translating case which presumes Hicks-neutral technical change. 
Output translating technical change leaves the marginal rate of substitution between inputs unchanged. 
It is operationalized by defining Yi(yi ,A)=fi(yi, a
+, a
-) where a
+ denotes positive technical change and a
-







s-.  Biased technical change allows for a change in the marginal rate of substitution and can
be operationalized via input translating technical change where Fi(x, B)=fi(x, b
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The inequality in (2) involves variables which are not directly observable.  Therefore, the market
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+ (where applicable) and 0i
ts, and rewrite (2) as dNz $c using appropriate definitions of the matrix
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where b is a vector of weights in the objective function, d is a vector of known data points, and c is a
vector of constraint values.
4  The program in (3) is implemented over the time periods where s￿t.    
Chalfant and Zhang (1997) point out that nonparametric tests like in (3) are not invariant to data
scaling.  We incorporate their suggestion of using price vectors as weight scale adjustments in the
objective function to minimize variance.  For example, if b=" " in (3), incorporating Chalfant and Zhang’s
adjustment results in b=" "p where p is the chosen price vector for scale adjustment.
Additionally, monopsony market power cannot be appropriately measured when input supply
shifts between time-period comparisons.  Such shifts will result in input price movements that are clearly
not attributable to market power exertion.  However, supply shifts unmatched by shifts in input demand
are easily detected since such shifts will cause input price and quantity to move in opposite directions
between observations.  Deleting comparisons where )rn does not have the same sign as )xni can reduce
the possibility of biased market power estimates (Love and Shumway).  In practice, comparisons




shifts without corresponding demand shifts.
Market Power in Multiple Input Markets
Love and Shumway’s nonparametric approach to monopsony market power estimation is easily
extended to measure monopsony market power in multiple input markets.  Following (2), the first-order10
profit maximizing condition for firm i with potential monopsony market power in multiple input
































where f is the number of input markets where the firm potentially exerts monopsony power, 0vi
ts is the
respective price flexibility of firm i’s residual supply curve for input v, and other variables are as
previously defined.  More specifically, the first-order profit maximizing condition for firm i with market





































where rn-1 is the price of input xn-1.  The price flexibilities of the ith firm’s perceived residual supply
curves for xn-1 and xn are represented by 0
ts
n-1,i and 0ni




ts are direct measures of the monopsony Lerner index for the respective inputs.  Equation (5)
replaces (2) as the necessary and sufficient condition for the firm’s decision set Si to be consistent with
profit maximization as represented by WAPM where monopsony power is presumed in two input
markets.  Again, using appropriate definitions of the matrix d and vector c and now rewriting (5) as
d’z$c, we implement the test as the linear programming problem represented in (3).  We delete





The test must be implemented using time series data for output price and quantity and for input
prices and quantities.  We implement the test using annual 1977 to 1993 price and quantity data for
outputs and inputs from the U.S. cigarette manufacturing industry.   Aggregate domestic cigarette
production and price are used as measures of output quantity and price.  Input prices and quantities are
included for domestic tobacco purchases, imported tobacco, labor, materials other than tobacco, capital,
and advertising.  A complete listing of variable names and definitions is included in Table 1.  All indices
are constructed using 1982 as the base year.  Variable names used in application are listed in
parentheses.   
Four types of cigarettes and their prices are used in calculating a Divisia price index for domestic
cigarette price:  standard cigarettes (70 mm nonfilter), filter tip cigarettes (80 mm), king (85 mm
nonfiltered and filtered) and extra long (100 mm filter tip).  Price and quantity data, along with excise
tax data, for these cigarette types are taken from USDA Tobacco Situation and Outlook (TSO).  The
annual prices for each type are calculated by weighting corresponding wholesale cigarette price revisions
by the fraction of the year that the price was in effect and then subtracting the effective excise tax to
reflect the final price received by cigarette manufacturers.  The resulting price index for domestic
cigarette price (py) is then constructed net of excise tax.  Domestic cigarette production (y) is calculated
as the total value of cigarettes (net of excise tax) divided by the price index py. 
Domestic tobacco price and quantity data are taken from various issues of TSO and consist of
estimated leaf tobacco used in domestic cigarette production and annual average prices received by
growers for unstemmed flue-cured, unstemmed burley, and unstemmed Maryland tobacco as reported in
farm sales weight.  These varieties are chosen because they represent the principal types of leaf tobacco12
used in domestic cigarette production.  A Divisia price index for domestic tobacco (rus) is constructed. 
Domestic tobacco quantity (xus) is constructed as the total value of these three tobacco varieties used in
domestic cigarette production divided by rus.
The source for imported tobacco data is the Department of Commerce’s U.S. Imports for
Consumption and General Imports: FT246 and FT247.  The category of tobacco used in cigarette
production is called cigarette leaf tobacco and includes five types of tobacco:  unstemmed Oriental,
unstemmed flue-cured, unstemmed burley, stemmed tobacco except cigar leaf and scrap tobacco except
cigar leaf.  Price and quantity information for these categories is used to create a Divisia price index for
imported tobacco (ri).  Quantity of imported tobacco (xi) is calculated as total value of imports for these
five categories divided by ri.  
Residual materials cost is calculated by subtracting the cost of domestic and imported tobacco
from cost of materials as reported in the Annual Survey of Manufacturers, various issues.  The price
index of other materials is proxied by the producer price index for materials as reported in the Economic
Report of the President.  A quantity index for other materials (xm) is constructed by dividing the residual
materials cost by the producer price index for materials (rm).
Data on advertising expenditures for cigarette manufacturers are taken from TSO.  A quantity
index for advertising (xa) is obtained by dividing the cigarette industry’s reported annual expenditures on
advertising by the cost per thousand advertising price index for magazines.  The price index for
magazines is chosen as a proxy for cost per unit of advertising (ra) since magazine advertisements
represent a major portion of advertising expenditures for cigarette manufacturers.  This index is
constructed from indices reported in USDA’s Food Marketing Review, 1992-1993 and various issues of
Advertising Age.   13
Data regarding the cost of labor and the number of employees in cigarette manufacturing are
taken from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers.  Total compensation is divided by the number of
employees to calculate average annual compensation per employee.  This measure is then normalized to
the base year of 1982.  The resulting price index for labor (rL) is used to obtain the quantity of labor (xL)
via total compensation divided by rL. 
 Capital price is calculated as the annual cost per unit of capacity where total capacity is the
proxy for quantity of capital.  Total capacity is recovered by dividing actual cigarette production by the
capacity utilization rate as reported in Annual Survey of Manufacturers.  Annual total cost of capital is
calculated assuming a 10 year depreciation rate of new capital expenditures (also from Annual Survey of
Manufacturers) with no salvage value.  A 5 year moving-average of Moody’s Aaa corporate bond rate
from the Economic Report of the President is used to estimate annual interest costs.  Total annual capital
service cost is the sum of depreciation charges and interest charges.  Dividing total capital services cost
by total capacity gives capital price per unit of capacity.  Capital price per unit of capacity is normalized
to the base year of 1982 and the resulting index is used to represent annual cost per unit of capacity (rc). 
Quantity of capacity (xc) is constructed as total capital service cost divided by rc.  
Results
Three test results are presented.  First, Chavas and Cox’s (1990) weak separability test is
employed to determine whether the cigarette manufacturing industry has experienced biased technical
change.  Second, we implement Love and Shumway’s test to investigate monopsony power exertion by
U.S. cigarette manufacturers in procuring domestic tobacco.  Third, we implement our extended
approach to measure monopsony power exertion by U.S. cigarette manufacturers in both domestic and
import markets.  14
We implement Chavas and Cox’s test to investigate the weak separability of all inputs from the
technology indices (Chavas and Cox, p. 453).  If weak separability for all inputs holds, we can assume
that the marginal rate of substitution between any two inputs is independent of technical change, i.e.
Hicks-neutral technical change.  Results of the weak separability test indicate that the input vector is
weakly separable from the technology indices, suggesting that this data set does not exhibit input
biasedness and that representation of technical change through output translation is a viable choice for
this data set.  
Market power tests are implemented using GAMS.  All tests define p, the chosen price vector for
scale adjustment, as the vector of mean output and input prices for the sample period.  We conduct Love
and Shumway’s single input test and our adaptation to the two input case under two different scenarios
regarding technical change.  One set assumes the possibility of Hicks-neutral technical change only,
while the second set allows the possibility of both Hicks-neutral and biased technical change.  The two
input case is also conducted under various weighting schemes regarding technical change, as denoted in
the tables.  Specific programming problems as defined in equations (2) and (5) for the cigarette
manufacturing industry are reported in Table 2 and Table 3.  Table 2 includes programming problems
that allow only Hicks-neutral technical change.  Table 3 includes programming problems that allow both
Hicks-neutral and biased technical change. 
Test results for cases where monopsony power is allowed in the domestic tobacco market (single
input case) and where monopsony power is allowed in both the domestic tobacco market and
international tobacco market (two input case) allowing only the possibility of Hicks-neutral technical
change are presented in Table 4.  Test results for the single and two input cases where both Hicks-neutral
and biased technical change are allowed are presented in Table 5.  In general, the results indicate that15
cigarette manufacturers exert economically significant monopsony market power in the domestic
tobacco market.  Average estimated monopsony Lerner indices for domestic tobacco in both the single
and two input cases under both technical change scenarios indicate substantial departures from
competitive pricing by cigarette manufacturers.  Under both scenarios of technical change, Love and
Shumway’s test for monopsony power in a single input market indicates that cigarette manufacturers
appropriate relatively large monopsony rents in the domestic tobacco market.  When only Hicks-neutral
technical change is allowed and all " "=1 (i.e. market power and technical change weighted equally at
one), 0us = 3.044.
5  Such a measure indicates that cigarette manufacturers internally value domestic
tobacco at 304 percent of the price paid to growers.  When the possibility of both Hicks-neutral and
biased technical change is included under the same weighting scenario, 0us = 3.869.  
Market power estimates are obtained under various weighting schemes for " " (the vector of
weights on market power and technical change) within the linear programming problem for the two
input case.  The first set of weighting schemes holds all technical change weights at one while choosing
market power weights from the range {1, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10}.  The second set of weighting schemes hold all
market power weights at one while choosing technical change weights from the range {1, 2.5, 5, 7.5,
10}.  Tests in the two input case also indicate economically significant monopsony power exertion in the
domestic tobacco market, though the magnitude is slightly smaller than in the single input case.  Under
the assumption of Hicks-neutral technical change only and all " "=1, 0us = 2.879.  Again, the interpretation
of 0us=2.879 is that cigarette manufacturers internally value domestic tobacco at 288 percent higher than
the price they pay to growers.  The measure of 0us is also 2.879 under the possibility of both Hicks-
neutral and biased technical change.  In fact, the monopsony Lerner index measure is identical for both
technical change scenarios under all weighting schemes for " ", including when technical change is16
weighted 10 times more heavily than market power and when market power is weighted 10 times more
heavily than technical change.
Results from the two input case suggest that U.S. cigarette manufacturers’ monopsony market
power in the tobacco import market is much less in magnitude than in the domestic market.  However, it
may be economically significant as well.  The average monopsony Lerner index for the international
tobacco market, 0i, is estimated at 0.236 under all weighting schemes, suggesting that cigarette
manufacturers internally value imported tobacco at 23.6 percent above the price they pay on the
international market.
Solution values for Hicks-neutral technical change parameters are also reported in Tables 4 and
5.  Table 5 also reports solution values for biased technical change parameters.  Biased technical change
parameters are zero in all cases, confirming that Hicks-neutral technical change is a reasonable
assumption for this data set.  In fact, market power parameters for both 0us and 0i are identical across
technical change assumptions and across weighting schemes.  
Monopsony Lerner index estimates for domestic tobacco and imported tobacco by period
(assuming equal weights of one) are reported in Table 6.   Blank cells indicate no detected market power
exertion during that period.  Period by period results are consistent in supporting economically
significant monopsony market power in the domestic tobacco market and substantially less monopsony
market power by U.S. cigarette manufacturers in the international tobacco market.  In the case of
domestic tobacco purchases, results indicate that cigarette manufacturers exerted economically
significant monopsony market power in several periods prior to 1987.  However, in 1987 and following
years, monopsony market power detected by the test is generally less in magnitude than pre-1987
measures.  The decrease in market power exertion for the later period in the sample may be partially17
attributed to the Tobacco Improvement Act of 1985 which reduced price supports and quota formulas in
an effort to generate more market-oriented price and production levels.  The Act also required domestic
manufacturers to purchase existing loan stocks.  It is possible that these revisions lessened the capability
of domestic manufacturers to exert monopsony market power in procuring domestically grown tobacco. 
Period by period measures for purchases of imported tobacco indicate that in most years, no market
power exertion is detected.  However, monopsony market power is detected in two of the most recent
three years of the sample, perhaps lending support to the DOJ’s recent inquiry into the presence of price
fixing by cigarette manufacturers in the purchase of imported tobacco.
The implications of monopsony market power exertion in the domestic market may be illustrated
using information regarding cigarette manufacturers’ cost per pack of cigarettes (Table 7).  Over the
period sample, the average cost of domestic tobacco in a pack of cigarettes is $0.04 while 0us=2.879 (two
input case, " "=1).  Recall that 0=(VMP-r)/r where r is input price.  Using rus=$0.04 to represent domestic
tobacco price on a cost per pack basis, the previous equation can be solved for VMP, i.e. the internal
value of that tobacco to the cigarette manufacturer.  In this case VMP=$0.15, indicating that cigarette
manufacturers value the domestically produced tobacco in a pack of cigarettes at $0.11 higher than the
price they actually pay to producers for that tobacco.  A similar measure can be calculated on a per
pound basis using the average price per pound of domestic tobacco for the time period (r Gus).  Since
r Gus=$0.88 and 0us=2.879, this implies that VMP per pound for cigarette manufacturers is $3.41, i.e. $2.53
higher than the price per pound paid to producers.  For comparison, Fulginiti and Perrin’s (1993) supply
elasticity estimate for domestic tobacco under the assumption of no tobacco program is 7.14.  This
would result in 0us=0.14 under full monopsony power exertion since 0 is defined as the price flexibility
of supply.  Using r Gus=$0.88 implies that VMP per pound for cigarette manufacturers assuming no18
tobacco program and holding all else constant would be $1.00 or only $0.12 higher than the price per
pound paid to producers.      
Overall, the results are not surprising, given that the U.S. cigarette manufacturing industry is
characterized domestically as a few manufacturers purchasing tobacco from a large number of growers
and internationally as facing more competition among cigarette manufacturers.  Domestically, these
results indicate that tobacco program rents resulting from reduced output are being captured in large part
by U.S. cigarette manufacturers rather than by tobacco producers who are typically assumed to receive
program benefits.  
Summary and Conclusions 
Traditional market power analyses of the cigarette manufacturing industry have considered
monopoly power exertion by manufacturers in selling cigarettes to consumers.  The characteristics of the
market relationship between U.S. cigarette manufacturers and U.S. tobacco producers make it quite
plausible that manufacturers exert monopsony market power in procuring domestic tobacco.  The fact
that the U.S. is a relatively large purchaser of tobacco in the world market makes monopsony power
exertion plausible in that market as well.  We investigate the possibility of monopsony market power
exertion by U.S. cigarette manufacturers in both the domestic and international tobacco markets by
extending Love and Shumway’s test to include potential monopsony market power in multiple input
markets.  Tests for the single input and two input cases are implemented using annual data from the
cigarette manufacturing industry.  The tests are implemented under two sets of assumptions regarding
technical change.  The first set allows Hicks-neutral technical change only, while the second set allows
both Hicks-neutral and biased technical change.  Results in the single input case under both technical
change assumptions indicate a substantial departure from competitive pricing by cigarette manufacturers19
in the input market for domestic unprocessed tobacco.  This result is supported by the outcome in the
two input case under both technical change assumptions and bolsters the postulate that cigarette
manufacturers are able to appropriate monopsony rents through the U.S. tobacco program.  The estimate
of monopsony market power exertion by cigarette manufacturers is relatively large and of similar
magnitude as in the single input case.  Results suggest that U.S. cigarette manufacturers exert
monopsony market power of much smaller magnitude in the world tobacco market.  However, results
from the most recent years in the study reveal that market power in the import market may be increasing,
lending credence to the Justice Department’s recent inquiry into price fixing by cigarette manufacturers.
Our results differ from those of traditional economic analysis of this industry in two significant
ways.  First, traditional economic analysis of cigarette manufacturers has assumed the possibility of
monopoly power exertion in output while assuming competitive behavior in tobacco procurement.  Our
analysis does not a priori assume competitive procurement behavior by cigarette manufacturers and, in
fact, indicates that they exert substantial monopsony power in the domestic tobacco market and at least
some monopsony power in the world tobacco market.  Second, the standard assumption in studies of the
U.S. tobacco production sector is that the tobacco program successfully transfers quota rent to producers. 
Our results suggest instead that benefits from the U.S. tobacco program accrue largely to cigarette
manufacturers, rather than to tobacco growers as commonly assumed.  High cigarette manufacturer
concentration and the structure of the U.S. tobacco program may combine to give cigarette
manufacturers the efficacy to use the program as a vehicle for monopsony power exertion to capture a
large portion of quota rents previously assumed to be captured by producers.  Overall, this analysis
suggests that policy analyses that a priori assume tobacco program benefits accrue to quota owners
should be reconsidered. 20
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NOTES
1. Hamilton analyzes cigarette manufacturing data for the period 1924-1939 for joint oligopoly-
oligopsony power.  His results suggest that cigarette manufacturers practiced oligopolistic
cigarette pricing during this period, but not oligopsony price coordination.
2. The minimum reserve-stock levels for flue-cured and burley tobacco are 100 million pounds and
50 million pounds, respectively.
3. However, the estimated administrative cost of the program is $16 million per year.
4. See Tables 2 and 3 for specific empirical equations used in the linear programming problem for
this data set.
5. 0us represents the average 0us
ts over all comparisons within the sample period and where no shifts
occurred.Table 1.  Variable Definitions for Empirical Equations.
Variable Definition
py Domestic wholesale price of cigarettes, net of excise tax (Divisia index)
y Domestic quantity of cigarettes produced (1000's)
rus Domestic price per lb. pd to producers (Divisia index)
xus Domestic tobacco purchased by cigarette manufacturers (lbs)
ri Price of tobacco imports (Divisia index)
xi Imported tobacco for cigarettes (lbs)
rL Average annual compensation of workers in cigarette manufacturers ($'s)
xL Annual # of workers employed by cigarette manufacturers
rm Price of materials other than tobacco (PPI for containers)
xm Materials other than tobacco
rc Price per Unit of Capacity
xc Total annual capacity
ra Price per unit of advertising (PPI for magazine advertising)
xa Quantity of Advertising per yearp
t
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Table 3.  Single Input and Two Input Monopsony Market Power Tests Allowing Hicks Neutral
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a $ 0, ￿ t
Note:   Parameters denoted by overbars (e.g. and  ) represent mean price over the data set.  p rTable 4.  Nonparametric Test Results Allowing Hicks-Neutral Technical Change.


























1 1 3.044 ---- 23.598 24.545
1 1 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
1 2.5 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
1 5 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
1 7.5 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
1 10 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
2.5 1 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
5 1 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
7.5 1 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
10 1 2.879 0.236 0.330 9.821
aValues reported for variables represent overall average for data set, given assigned weights. Table 5.  Nonparametric Test Results Allowing Hicks-Neutral and Biased Technical Change.














































1 1 3.869 ---- 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 1 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 2.5 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 5 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 7.5 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 10 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5 1 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 1 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7.5 1 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 1 2.879 0.236 0.100 2.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
aValues reported for variables represent overall average for data set, given assigned weights. Table 6.  Monopsony Market Power Estimate Average (0 0
t) by Time Period for Domestic and
Imported Tobacco Purchases.
a
Hicks Neutral Technical Change
Allowed





























1991 2.013 1.521 2.013 1.521
1992 0.495 0.495
1993
Average 0 2.879 0.236 2.879 0.236
aAll "’s set to one for this analysis. 
bValues reported for variables represent overall average for time period. Table 7.  Average Cost per Cigarette Pack for U.S. Cigarette Manufacturers using Four-digit SIC data 










1977  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.13  0.20  0.07 
1978  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.14  0.22  0.08 
1979  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.15  0.24  0.10 
1980  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.18  0.27  0.10 
1981  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.20  0.31  0.12 
1982  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.22  0.37  0.15 
1983  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.24  0.41  0.18 
1984  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.26  0.45  0.20 
1985  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.27  0.50  0.22 
1986  0.04  0.07  0.08  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.27  0.55  0.28 
1987  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.27  0.60  0.33 
1988  0.05  0.09  0.08  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.29  0.68  0.39 
1989  0.05  0.11  0.08  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.31  0.78  0.47 
1990  0.05  0.11  0.08  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.32  0.88  0.56 
1991  0.05  0.13  0.08  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.34  0.99  0.64 
1992  0.05  0.15  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.35  1.11  0.76 
1993  0.05  0.18  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.38  1.07  0.69 
AVG 0.04 0.08  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.25  0.57  0.31 